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Abstract
The target paper (building on Ginsburg and Jablonka in JTB 381:55–60, 2015, 
The evolution of the sensitive soul: Learning and the origins of consciousness, 
MIT Press, USA, 2019) makes a significant and novel claim: that positive cases of 
non-human consciousness can be identified via the capacity of unlimited associa-
tive learning (UAL). In turn, this claim is generated by a novel methodology, which 
is that of identifying an evolutionary ‘transition marker’, which is claimed to have 
theoretical and empirical advantages over other approaches. In this commentary I 
argue that UAL does not function as a successful transition marker (as defined by 
the authors), and has internal problems of its own. However, I conclude that it is still 
a very productive anchor for new research on the evolution of consciousness.
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A different methodology: A fairly standard way of generating empirical markers of 
consciousness is to posit some capacity that is identical to or highly correlated with 
the presence of consciousness, and then generate operationalisations of that capac-
ity. So, if one thinks that global broadcast of information in the brain is what makes 
content conscious, then one searches for ways to operationally test for that, for 
example by tracking neurophysiological activity, or specific behaviours that are only 
possible as a result of global broadcast.
According to the target paper, investigating consciousness using transition mark-
ers works differently. Transition markers are supposed to be based on an agreed 
set of sufficient criteria for the state in question. Even if there are disagreements 
about which criteria are necessary for something to be classed as (for example) 
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alive or conscious, or if there are differences in theories about life or consciousness, 
researchers can usually agree on what counts as a set of sufficient conditions. Taking 
these, one can try to identify a single marker that requires that all of these sufficient 
conditions be satisfied. Any entity that displays this single marker therefore satisfies 
all the sufficient conditions for being in a particular state.
Other aspects of the idea of transition markers trace back to Gánti (2003) and 
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s (1997) work on the evolution of life from non-
living systems. Gánti proposed an abstract, dynamical chemical model of a ‘chemo-
ton’ which satisfied his (sufficient) criteria for living systems. In at least some forms, 
the chemoton was capable of ‘unlimited heredity’: it was capable of open-ended 
evolution, which is a feature of all living systems. Changing some of the features 
of the chemoton makes it capable of only limited heredity, associated with being a 
‘minimal’ living system. These different versions of the model therefore suggest a 
possible evolutionary path from non-living systems, to minimal living systems with 
limited heredity, to ‘full’ living systems with unlimited heredity. Unlimited heredity 
functions as a ‘transition marker’ in this evolutionary path to living systems.
Birch et al. (also Ginsburg and Jablonkas 2015, 2019) argue that focussing on a 
single transition marker, rather than a longer list of criteria, comes with a range of 
methodological advantages. They state that using transition markers “…allows theo-
retical and empirical research programmes to aim at a single, common goal, despite 
a potentially significant amount of underlying divergence in views about the funda-
mental nature of [the concept in question]” [p. 5 of 24 in ms.]. Further, the abstract 
nature of transition markers allows researchers to construct minimal models of e.g. 
living or conscious systems, to identify transitional evolutionary states between e.g. 
non-conscious and conscious organisms, to date the emergence of these states, and 
(plausibly) to map the transition marker to different realisations across different neu-
robiological and neurophysiological systems.
On these grounds Ginsburg and Jablonka (2015) criticise the standard approach 
to investigating (non-human) consciousness as essentially failing to offer the above 
advantages, and for failing to “go beyond a re-description of some of the necessary 
conditions for [the occurrence of consciousness]” (op cit, p. 58). So, for example, if 
one thinks that consciousness requires the global broadcast of information, global 
workspace models of consciousness merely re-describe and offer straightforward 
operationalisations of this necessary condition. Where researchers disagree on nec-
essary conditions (as they do), these operationalisations are not helpful for unifi-
ying and driving research, and neither does this approach suggest how the capacity 
evolved.
I think these criticisms are reasonable ones, but I next argue that the transition 
marker identified for consciousness in the target paper, unlimited associative learn-
ing (UAL), does not necessarily escape these problems.
UAL as a partial redescription: The criteria deemed sufficient for consciousness 
by Birch et  al. are roughly these: global accessibility, feature binding, attention, 
intentionality, integration of information over time, evaluative system(s) and agency, 
and recognition of (embodied) self vs. other. For unlimited associative learning 
(UAL) to be exhibited, it is claimed that these other markers must be satisfied: UAL 
therefore functions as a transition marker of consciousness. UAL is differentiated 
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from limited associative learning in specific ways. UAL requires the capacities for 
associative learning of compound and novel stimuli, second-order and trace condi-
tioning, and flexible and easily overwritten reward learning.
The first issue is that aside from calling these capacities sufficient rather than nec-
essary conditions for consciousness, UAL is partly just a redescription and straight-
forward operationalisation of some of these conditions. For example, associative 
learning of compound stimuli (part of UAL) is a fairly plausible operationalisation 
of the sufficient condition of feature binding, and UAL of multi-sensory stimuli is a 
plausible operationalisation of some form of global broadcast. Trace conditioning 
(again, part of UAL) is a way to operationalise the sufficient condition of integration 
of information over time. Reward learning is a straightforward operationalisation 
of the sufficient condition of having an evaluative system. Attention (another suf-
ficient condition) is plausibly linked to UAL, but is perhaps subsumed by the crite-
rion of global broadcasting (typically, global broadcast is a feature of only attention-
ally selected inputs). Finally, associative learning of novel stimuli seems to partly 
redescribe the ability for (unlimited) associative learning in the first place. In this 
case, UAL is subject to the same criticisms of e.g. the global workspace model in 
merely redescribing and operationalising an existing set of criteria (see Table 1 for 
summary).
Another transition marker: The second issue is that UAL does not obviously con-
nect to some of the other conditions identified as sufficient for consciousness, or at 
least is not the best way to capture these conditions in a transition marker. In Birch 
et al., intentionality is said to be required for representing and storing learned asso-
ciations. The target article also suggests that agency and embodiment are required 
for (any form of) action selection, and that these combined with self-other registra-
tion are necessary for (any form of) learning about the world (pp. 12–13 of ms.). 
These claims are hard to evaluate given their brief description in the paper, but 
their Table  1 describes suggested associated mechanisms and behavioural signa-
tures. From here, these conditions (intentionality, agency, embodiment, self-other 
registration) essentially turn out to refer to the capacity of an organism to generate 
egocentric representations of itself acting in space, where actions are goal-directed 
and selected in a top-down manner. This package of capacities has been separately 
defended as sufficient for consciousness by Merker (2007) and Barron and Klein 
(2016).
Arguably, the package of abilities linked with egocentric representations of the 
moving body in space provides a much better transition marker for tracking the 
Table 1  Summary of relationships between conditions and operationalisations
Sufficient condition for consciousness Operationalised as a type of 
associative learning (AL)
Feature binding AL of compound stimuli
Global broadcast (usually includes attention) AL of multi-sensory stimuli
Integration of information over time Trace conditioning
Having an evaluative system Reward learning
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emergence of this second subset of sufficient conditions for consciousness than any-
thing based on unlimited associative learning. UAL is not well placed to capture 
what is really required for top-down control of goal-directed actions, or representa-
tions of the body in the world. They are clearly related: some kinds of associated 
learning (such as spatial learning) are plausibly only possible when an organism has 
an egocentric representation of itself in space. However, top-down control of actions 
is (plausibly) not well tracked by capacities for associative learning. In this case, it 
makes sense to use a different transition marker, or at least a different package of 
capacities, to track these criteria.
At this point then, Birch et al.’s sufficient criteria for consciousness split into two: 
one set that come with fairly straightforward operationalisations in terms of associa-
tive learning, and so tracking standard methods for investigating consciousness (see 
Table 1 again), and another set based on agency, embodiment, and so on that is bet-
ter captured by a different transition marker or package of related capacities. This is 
obviously rather messier than the original proposal.
Does it matter?: However, I don’t think that this splintering up of transition mark-
ers is necessarily a problem for research programmes focussed on the evolution of 
consciousness. UAL gets something right: it suggests that by focussing on different 
types of learning we can also test for the presence of lots of other cognitive abilities 
(i.e. those required for those types of learning), that are generally agreed to be suf-
ficient for consciousness. As experimental paradigms for different types of learning 
are well established, and in many cases have been applied to a range of organisms, 
they provide a productive focus for research whether UAL is really based on a new 
method or not.
Similarly, it is not the end of the world if some sufficient conditions for con-
sciousness are better tracked by other means, for example by assessing decision 
making capacities. Associative learning can certainly inform decision making, but 
associative learning abilities alone are unlikely to be the best route to tracking the 
(reasonably) complex decision making capacities associated with the second sub-
set of sufficient conditions. For example, testing associative learning capacities is a 
perfectly reasonable way of testing whether an organism can integrate information 
over time, via trace conditioning, but does not seem a particularly direct or effective 
way of testing whether an organism can engage in online action selection in a com-
plex body in the face of changing sensory information. Instead, it seems plausible to 
assess these abilities using established behavioural paradigms specific to these abili-
ties, and related neuroanatomical research concerning online action control. There is 
no obvious theoretical pay-off in cutting connections to relevant areas of empirical 
research.
In sum then, the target paper tries to provide a focus for empirical and theoretical 
research by identifying a single transition marker. I have suggested that UAL does 
not work as a transition marker in the way the authors suggest. However, even if a 
single transition marker of consciousness cannot be found, there is still unity to be 
found in the set of agreed sufficient conditions for the presence of consciousness. If 
numerous research programs emerge from this, each of which target a different set 
of sufficient conditions, and different sets of mechanisms, it is not clear to me that 
anything important will have been lost. Indeed, this might open up our ideas further 
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on there being different evolutionary routes to consciousness, and perhaps different 
types of consciousness altogether.
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